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Abstract 
The 1971 Immigration Act constitutes the most important piece of legislation for the 
regulation of immigration to Britain. Many assume that the Act was simply a further 
extension of the restrictive measures established over the post-war period to end non-
white immigration. Based on original archival material, I argue that the Act was 
established in reaction to the dilemma the government faced as a result of joining the 
European Economic Community and the free movement of workers against 
Commonwealth migrants. The Act represents the final dismantling of universal 
Commonwealth citizenship and, in this sense, a definitive acceptance of the end of the 
Empire.  
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Introduction 
Britain was once dubbed as a ‘country of zero immigration’ and not without cause.1 
Throughout the twentieth century successive governments, regardless of party 
affiliation, sought to limit colonial immigration on the assumption that good race 
relations necessitated minimum immigration. This was the bipartisan consensus that 
underpinned Britain’s immigration policy for fifty years. In contrast, the 2010s see 
immigration squarely on the political agenda, dominating election campaigns across 
the party spectrum. Yet what is unique about current debates is that much of this 
migration is free mobility. As a result we saw free movement as a major cornerstone 
in Prime Minister Cameron’s EU reform negotiations, and a government committed 
to reducing immigration.  
The current and previous Conservative led government’s strategy for 
restricting immigration has been to pursue a net migration target where the 
government seek to bring immigration down from the hundreds of thousands to the 
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tens of thousands2. Under the previous Conservative governments (2010-2015; 2015-
2016) these efforts were led by former Home Secretary (now Prime Minister) Theresa 
May, but her ability to do so is due to the almost absolute discretion given to the 
Secretary of State laid down in the 1971 Immigration Act. This Act remains the 
primary instrument for the Home Secretary to demarcate who can legally enter, reside 
and settle in Britain and is the statutory basis for all immigration rules. Consequently, 
Britain’s immigration policy is a flexible one, able to respond to the political will of 
the governing party, and this power stems from the authority enshrined in the 1971 
Act. 
The Act is understood to have come about due to the political elite adopting a 
racialist logic to their policies 3  and/or public pressure to restrict non-white 
immigration4.  Thus it is regarded as a further extension of the restrictive logic that 
underpinned the 1962 and 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Acts. Whilst the latter 
two statutes have received a great deal of academic attention5, the 1971 Act has, 
comparatively, not. This is curious given the legislative significance of the Act.  
Based on archival material6 I argue through an historical institutionalist lens, 
that the development of this instrument was not simply an extension of a racialist 
logic. Conversely, I argue that the motivations behind the Act were in part 
geopolitical because the early 1970s, when the Act was devised, was a pivotal 
moment for a Britain preparing to join  the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Whilst restricting further settlement of New Commonwealth immigrants was the 
predominant rationale for the establishment of the 1971 Act, contrary to other 
accounts I argue that the restrictive measure was made on the basis of the “numbers 
game” due to the impending wave of now permit free foreign labour from the EEC as 
underpinned in the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. The implications of free 
mobility combined with public demands to reduce colonial immigration put the 
government in a difficult position, whereby they were forced to make a decision 
between maintaining a preference for Commonwealth migrants and joining the 
Community. The government conceded to the latter. Such a decision was emblematic 
of the government’s changing relationship with the Commonwealth; one that had 
moved from an old conception of a cohesive intergovernmental forum based on 
common interests, towards the favouring of a new alliance with the European 
Community where, by implication if not necessity, the British government finally 
resolved that the common bonds of the Commonwealth had eroded. The Act was the 
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final dismantling of universal Commonwealth citizenship and, in this sense, a 
definitive acceptance of the end of the Empire. 
 
Building fortress Britain 
In contrast to other Western states which facilitated immigration through formal 
programmes to varying degrees7, post-war Commonwealth immigration to Britain 
was largely spontaneous and always entirely unwanted. For the first ‘three decades of 
the post-war period, polling data reveal consistent majority public opposition to New 
Commonwealth migration’8, archival sources show uneasiness in Whitehall over non-
white migration, and the scholarly literature, without exception, stresses the hostility 
and racism of successive British governments towards New Commonwealth 
migration9. Why did the British governments pursue such a relentlessly restrictive line 
on colonial immigration? The simplest explanation is that across British society, black 
and Asian immigration was perceived as a ‘problem’ in need of controlling, as 
demonstrated by the fact that the majority of post-war (and indeed pre-war) measures 
were entirely targeted at non-white immigrants. Yet such policies ultimately derived 
from Britain’s reluctance to relinquish the once great Empire 10 , a reflection of 
Britain’s ‘post-imperial hangover’11. For what is unique about Britain’s migration 
story ‘is that it was a movement of citizens within an imperial polity, rather than a 
movement of aliens to a sovereign territory’12. This was a  framework of citizenship 
that was eventually abandoned as the British government’s foreign policy interests 
evolved and shifted.  
Although migration policy had been informed by two other Acts pre 1945 – 
the Aliens Act of 1905 and the Aliens Restriction Act of 1914 – it was only post 1945 
that ‘immigration beyond Europe became significant enough to register as a major 
political issue’. 13 Previously, citizenship had been derived from a common code of 
British subjecthood, but as Commonwealth countries began to gain independence, it 
was evident that this overarching mode of citizenship was no longer sustainable. The 
government had to negotiate the process of decolonialization whilst maintaining the 
doctrine of equal rights for all British subjects, a principle at the very core of 
Commonwealth identity. Thus Britain’s immigration policy essentially began in 1948, 
with the establishment of the British Nationality Act (BNA) which conferred British 
subject status − Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies (CUKC) − to all 
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members of the Empire (an estimated 600 million people), serving as a last attempt to 
reaffirm Britain as the leader of the Commonwealth, ‘to reinforce a notion of imperial 
unity wobbling under the impact of decolonization’14. As the Minister of State for 
Colonial Affairs in the Churchill Government proudly told the House of Commons in 
1954: ‘In a world in which restrictions on personal movement and immigration have 
increased we still take pride in the fact that a man can say civis Britannicus sum 
whatever his colour may be, and we take pride in the fact that he wants and can come 
to the mother country’15. 
 Yet the BNA had a constitutional purpose and was not expected to facilitate 
immigration. Extraordinarily, at no stage in the debates over the Bill was the 
possibility entertained that substantial numbers of colonial citizens could, or would, 
exercise their right to permanently reside in Britain, although prominent 
Conservatives in the House of Lords did suggest that attempts to define a 
Commonwealth citizen would lead to division and legal arguments16.  
Following Britain’s post-war reconstruction, initially this all-encompassing 
citizenship proved to be advantageous for Britain’s labour market. However, Britain’s 
aspiration to preserve some hold on the empire came with some unexpected and 
unwanted consequences. Following the BNA, a wave of unanticipated 
Commonwealth migrants arrived on Britain’s shores, symbolised by the infamous 
arrival of the Empire Windrush in 1948, although it should be noted how 
comparatively small such flows were in contrast to European migrants17. Nonetheless, 
Black and Asian immigrants’ permanent settlement in Britain was undoubtedly 
viewed as a problem by the political elite, supported by the Royal Commission on 
Population 18  and the independent Political and Economic Planning institute who 
claimed that ‘the absorption of large numbers of non-white immigrants would be 
extremely difficult’19. Yet immigration legislation, the elite argued, would undermine 
Commonwealth unity. As a result, during the 1950s the government attempted to limit 
colonial immigration through administrative measures, including incentives to 
colonial governments to limit the issuance of passports and travel documents, along 
with wider dissuasion tactics to discourage colonial immigrants from coming to 
Britain20. As Ian Spencer speculates, this was ‘defacto immigration policy’21. 
Whilst Black and Asian settlement remained an unwanted presence, the 
international of Britain’s standing in the Commonwealth deterred the government 
from pursuing legislative action. In short, neither the public, the Labour Party nor the 
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government deemed that the ‘problem’ was serious enough yet to pay the political 
price for restrictions on colonial immigrants 22 . Alongside such developments, as 
migration was concerned the doctrine of Civis Britannicus sum symbolized a 
commitment to movement between the Old (white) commonwealth and Britain. Thus 
as Old Commonwealth countries pursued their interests within a regional rather than 
Commonwealth framework, so support for the doctrine declined, and in turn the 
barriers to immigration controls were loosened. 
 As rumours spread that immigration controls were imminent, a record net 
immigration of 191,100 was recorded for 1960-1, more than for the previous five 
years combined23. In turn, the Cabinet committee on colonial immigrants warned in a 
memo that ‘the movement was reaching a stage at which the government would be 
obliged to introduce legislation to enable them to control it’ 24 . By 1961 the 
government conceded that this was an untenable situation in need of legislation, 
which came in the form of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act (CIA).  
The 1962 Act severely curtailed primary immigration by establishing a labour-
voucher system, marking a watershed moment for Britain and the Commonwealth as 
a whole – for the first time the right of British subjects to enter the ‘mother country’ 
was restricted. Exemption from immigration controls were made on two grounds: 
place of birth or the issuing authority of a CUKC passport (holders of a CUKC 
passport issued under the authority of London were exempt). Whilst the government 
faced real political difficulties at this stage, ‘it is hard to disagree with the claim that 
racial attitudes underlay the differential treatment’25, in particular that the Irish were 
exempt from these controls reflects the racist underwriting behind this legislation.  
While primary immigration decreased as a result of the 1962 Act, secondary 
immigration did not26, and by 1967 settlement of New Commonwealth citizens had 
greatly increased. Propelled by fears of so-called overcrowding27, this surge caused 
concern amongst the political elite. 28 Meanwhile, events outside of Britain left them 
in an even more contentious position.   
 Turbulent times were occurring in Africa; the Kenyatta government had begun 
an aggressive Africanization policy, where Kenyan residents without African descent 
were persecuted and expelled from the country. As a result, Kenyan Asians who 
possessed CUKC status who were exempt from 1962 CIA controls due to their 
passports being issued by a London authority, fled to Britain in fear of being left 
stateless. Troubled by an already antagonistic public, this unexpected wave of 
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immigration caused panic amongst the political elite. In turn, Home Secretary James 
Callaghan sought approval from Cabinet to introduce further legislation, including the 
withdrawal of the right of Kenyan CUKCs to enter Britain. He argued that it was, 
‘both urgent and essential’ to extend controls to those ‘who did not belong to this 
country in the sense of having any direct family connection with it or having been 
naturalized or adopted here’29. The pressures on social services, Callaghan argued, 
‘would be such that large additional expenditure would be required, and our race 
relations policy would be in jeopardy’30. ‘Wide support’, he assured ministers, ‘could 
be expected in this country for a policy on these lines’31. Subsequently, and given that 
the government left up to 200,000 people effectively stateless, most would say 
shamelessly, the government passed the 1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act (CIA), 
an Act that was ‘loathed by liberal opinion and loved by the public’32. 
 As we have seen, Britain’s post-war immigration regime was undoubtedly a 
restrictive one, predicated on notions of race, descent, belonging, nationality, and 
characterised by increasingly draconian measures. However, the rationale behind the 
establishment of the next and most critical Act was more labyrinthine than assumed.  
 
 
The final straw: the 1971 Immigration Act 
The rising political saliency of immigration in the late 1960s meant that there was 
potential for the ‘race card’ to be played in the 1970 General Election33. For the first 
time, immigration was the fourth most salient issue for voters in the Election.34 This 
was in no small part due to Conservative MP Enoch Powell’s contribution to the 
debate, when he infamously made his ‘rivers of blood’ speech in 1968. While Powell 
was sacked immediately from the shadow cabinet, ‘there is little doubt that Heath 
accepted that the public support enjoyed by Powell necessitated a greater 
restrictionism in Conservative policy’35. In turn, the Conservative Party toughened up 
their rhetoric and pledged in their manifesto to give the Home Secretary ‘complete 
control over the entry of individuals into Britain’, promising that ‘there will be no 
further large scale permanent immigration’36.  The Conservatives were rewarded by 
the public at the 1970 General Election37 with an unexpected victory, gaining an 
estimated increment of 6.7 per cent in votes because many ‘perceived them to be the 
party more likely to keep immigrants out’38.   
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 With an electoral pledge to curtail further immigration, action was needed but 
there was at the same time an imperative interest in preserving some hold of the 
Commonwealth, as Home Secretary Reginald Maudling argued, ‘[there is a case] on 
kith and kin grounds, for special provision for those Commonwealth citizens who 
have an ancestral connection with the UK’39. Yet it was difficult to achieve this 
without ‘discriminating between different members of the Commonwealth’40. The 
panacea was to pass an Act which included an exemption through patriality for those 
with a grandparent or parent born or naturalised in Britain41, a mechanism ‘clearly 
designed to secure access for Australians, Canadians and New Zealanders while 
denying it to the rest of the Commonwealth’42. The status quo was retained; the 
objective to limit unassimilable Colonial immigrants persisted.  
The 1971 Act represents the final deterioration of universal Commonwealth 
citizenship, and essentially ‘went as far as it could in explicitly diminishing the 
former privileges of Commonwealth citizens’. 43  Furthermore, the Act gave new 
unfettered powers to the Home Secretary by bestowing legal authority to grant leave 
to remain and make immigration rules. Such power remains in place today. The Act 
also gave new powers to deport Commonwealth migrants, and created new barriers so 
that Commonwealth migrants would need a work permit for a specific job, with only 
skilled immigrants being issued a permit. In effect, this meant that the criteria for 
permits for Commonwealth citizens would be stiffer than for aliens44: 
‘Through this reconstruction of subjecthood, the Act legally differentiated 
between the familial community of Britishness composed of the truly British-
those descended from white colonizers and the political community of 
Britishness composed of individuals who had become British through 
conquest or domination. The latter community discovered that as a result of 
the 1971 Immigration Act, their British nationality amounted to little more 
than a name on a passport and that their access to Britain was restricted in 
much the same way as it was for aliens.’45  
As controversial as the Act was, as a control mechanism it was redundant; the 
previous two statutes had effectively halted New Commonwealth flows 46 , and 
settlement had already decreased by roughly 1,000 between 1969 and 1972.47In turn, 
the Act was criticised for being a ‘sop to racial prejudice’ because it would have little 
effect on numbers48, and faced heavy criticism from the Labour Party49 − somewhat 
hypocritically given that ‘the blatantly racist aspects of the patriality clauses’ of the 
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Act were ‘foreshadowed’ in Labour’s own 1968 CIA 50  −  and NGOs 51  both on 
grounds of racial discrimination, and the new unfettered powers of the Home 
Secretary:  
‘It charts the dangers of injustice and abuse to be found in an executive 
discretion that can, and does, operate outside, and even in contradiction to, the 
recommendations of the Courts. It is a discretion almost totally unfettered by 
independent scrutiny and which lies beyond the safeguards of liberty.’52 
 Aside from criticism within Parliament, the Act also generated 
interdepartmental tensions, with the Treasury being particularly opposed, being 
concerned that the additional manpower needed as a consequence of the Act, would 
be disproportionate to the outcomes: 
‘ Political factors apart, the papers do not seem to me to advance any 
arguments which would justify incurring additional public expenditure of the 
order of £400,000 or £500,000 a year at a time of financial stringency. 
However, given that the decision has been made on political grounds, I do not 
think there is any point of detail to which we should object.’53  
 The DEP similarly raised concerns stating that they could not meet the 
extra cost within their public expenditure budget. At the heart of the Treasury’s 
objection was that the Bill would not actually achieve its objective of reducing 
Commonwealth immigration and that flows were likely to remain the same. 
Nonetheless, the ‘feeling in the [Conservative] Party [was] for no more immigration 
at all...it has proved impossible to reassure the public’.54 Thus despite widespread 
opposition, the Act passed and remains the principal statutory instrument to regulate 
immigration today.  
 It is not an unreasonable assumption then that the Act was merely an 
extension of the racial demographic logic which had punctuated the previous 25 
years, and represented a final bid to curtail non-white settlement. The implications of 
the Act certainly support this, and there is no contesting that the Act had the 
overriding objective to limit as far as possible the settlement of non-white immigrants. 
Yet, archival material suggests an alternative, more nuanced, rationale for the 
formulation of the Act, to which we now turn. 
 
The pivotal moment: Joining the community 
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Notwithstanding the general concern to limit colonial immigration, the 1971 Act was 
principally motivated by the “numbers game”. With 1973 came a pivotal and defining 
moment for Britain − acceptance to the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Leading up to accession the government undertook a long consultation on the possible 
areas of contention, as well as law and policy that would need to be adapted to align 
with the Community’s body of statutes. It was such deliberations that led to the most 
important piece of immigration legislation in Britain today. Indeed, ‘by a highly 
symbolic coincidence’, on the same day as the Act received royal assent, Britain 
entered the EEC55.  
 The establishment of the 1971 Act was symbolic of Britain’s changing 
geopolitical standing. Whilst the Commonwealth had been the cornerstone of 
Britain’s foreign policy agenda throughout the twentieth century, the government now 
favoured a new alliance with the emerging European Community. By implication, if 
not necessity, the British government finally resolved that the common bonds of the 
Commonwealth had eroded. Whilst the 1971 Act was first and foremost a 
immigration control mechanism, the rationale for the legislation was a reflection of 
where Britain’s interest lay geopolitically.  
 As Richard Leach wrote in 1973, ‘Great Britain is perhaps unique in that for 
over 200 years she has been associated in some way with other lands and people 
around the entire globe’.56 For a long time the most consequential relationship for 
Britain was with the Commonwealth. Indeed ‘Britain’s role in the Commonwealth is 
as unique as the presence of the Commonwealth itself, since Britain was the founder 
and the mother of the Parliamentary system which unified Commonwealth 
countries’. 57  As a result, Britain considered the obligations she assumed for the 
Commonwealth to be binding, ‘morally if not legally’.58  
 For both the British elite and public, the Commonwealth was viewed as the 
most important relationship throughout the early twentieth century, both in terms of 
collective identity and trade. The Commonwealth was most important to the average 
Briton during the World Wars when there was a resurgence of passion for the 
Commonwealth59, made more acute, amongst the public at least, following Britain’s 
rejected application to join the EEC in 1963.  
 Yet the 1950s saw major changes which had loosened the bonds of the 
Commonwealth, including the independence of Pakistan, India and Ceylon; the 
decision in 1949 to allow India to remain a member of the Commonwealth as a 
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republic and in turn ending the allegiance to the Crown; and the regionalization of 
Commonwealth defence policies, beginning with the Washington Treaty establishing 
NATO. As a result, by the 1960s the British government was disillusioned as 
members of the Commonwealth pulled away from Britain. Furthermore, economic 
turbulence in 1960s Britain compelled the government to reevaluate Britain’s 
obligations to the Commonwealth60. Nonetheless, members of the Commonwealth 
were still regarded as Britain’s chief allies. 
The allegiance to the Commonwealth was a key factor as to why Britain was so 
resistant to the notion of European integration, encapsulated in 1957 by Prime 
Minister Harold Macmillan when he stated that, ‘if there should at any time be a 
conflict between the calls upon us, there is no doubt where we stand; the 
Commonwealth comes first in our hearts and in our minds’.61 Whilst Britain was 
happy to lead on intergovernmental initiatives such as the establishment of the 
Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) and being a keen 
supporter of the Treaty of Brussels, the government was skeptical about any 
supranational implications of European cooperation.62  Yet it was becoming apparent 
how debilitating such reluctance to European integration was for Britain. Growth 
rates amongst the Six surpassed those in Britain63, and the government was beginning 
to realise that their global influence was diminishing: 
‘The Community may well emerge as a power comparable in size and influence 
to the United States and the USSR. The pull of this new power bloc would 
bound to dilute our influence with the rest of the world, including the 
Commonwealth…The independence which we have sought to preserve by 
remaining aloof from European integration would be of doubtful value, since 
our diminished status would suggest only a minor role for us in international 
affairs.’64   
 It was such sentiments that led to Britain’s first application to join the EEC in 
1963. Evidently Britain’s application was rejected in part because of Britain’s 
reluctance to abandon the Empire mentality. As De Gaulle said of the matter, Britain 
must ‘transform herself…without restriction or reservation, and prefer the E.C to 
every other connection’.65 Although Britain failed to join the Community, the attempt 
to re-align to a new international bloc left a legacy of bitterness among many 
Commonwealth members 66 , further propelling their efforts to break away from 
Britain’s hold. Although decolonization was presented as a ‘triumph of British 
 11 
policy’, the broadening of the Commonwealth clearly made it harder for Britain ‘to 
bend the Commonwealth to its own purposes now that Britain and the old dominions 
(Canada, Australia and New Zealand) were in a minority’.67 The ties that bound the 
Commonwealth were unraveling, trade across the Commonwealth was stagnant and 
the British government feared their international standing was diminishing. It was 
such a critical juncture which led Prime Minister Harold Wilson to announce his 
intention to submit a second application to the Community in November 1966, and 
for Britain to turn its back on the Commonwealth once and for all.  
 Although in 1967 Prime Minister Wilson claimed that ‘the Treaty of Rome in 
itself would have no direct effect on what we ourselves do about Commonwealth 
immigrants’68, as a consequence of joining the EEC Britain would have an unlimited 
pool of now permit-free foreign labour. In a political context of rising public concerns 
over immigration mentioned above, such an influx of EEC workers alongside further 
Commonwealth migration was seen as politically untenable, and raised a major 
dilemma for the British government, which ultimately led to a wider discussion on the 
future of the Commonwealth and Britain’s role and relationship within it.  
 Such introspection began with an enquiry into how Commonwealth countries 
would react if Britain were to accede to the Community. A Foreign Office report 
found that the damage had effectively been done following Britain’s rejected 
application for joining the Community in 1963, as Commonwealth governments felt 
Britain’s membership was ‘inevitable’, and therefore ‘with the possible exception of 
the West Indies are unlikely to react strongly to a decision to initiate negotiations’.69 
Nonetheless concerns were raised over the implications of Britain’s accession for 
Commonwealth migration.  
 Whether Commonwealth immigrants would enjoy the right to free mobility in 
the EEC created confusion in Westminster, a query first raised by Home Secretary 
Roy Jenkins. In response, Merlyn Rees MP stated that he did not foresee that this 
would be an issue, given that Commonwealth citizens had a requirement of five years 
residency before being allowed to register as a citizen of the UK and Colonies.70 Rees 
ultimately resolved that the matters of citizenship were ‘extremely complicated and 
therefore are not worth fighting about’71  
 Nonetheless, the issue remained unclear. The government assumed that many 
Commonwealth citizens would not want to work in other Member States due to 
language difficulties and ‘social differences’, although the DEP conceded that this 
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would only be the case as long as employment remained stable in Britain.72 On the 
other hand, Home Secretary Jenkins suggested that Britain’s entry into the EEC 
‘might well be advantageous to Commonwealth immigrants who had settled in this 
country, some of whom might well be attracted by employment in Europe’73, but that 
this would nonetheless ‘be only a slight political compensation for the implied change 
in our immigration arrangements resulting from the priority which would have to be 
given to EEC nationals over Commonwealth’.74 
 With the policy implications of joining the EEC becoming apparent, 
ramifications which would according to the Home Secretary be ‘highly embarrassing 
to the government’ 75 , it was resolved that an enquiry into the consequences for 
Commonwealth immigration would need to be undertaken. Prime Minister Wilson 
also conceded that Cabinet must provide material for public discussion of the 
approach to Europe, ‘since difficulties of presentation would arise in particularly 
sensitive areas e.g. political and social problems of immigration policy and the wider 
powers of Community institutions’.76 Indeed, Prime Minister Wilson resolved that 
‘Community law had little direct effect on the ordinary life of private citizens…the 
main impact of Community law would be in the realm of trade, customs, restrictive 
practices and immigration’.77  
 The Home Office led the report and confirmed that EEC nationals would have 
priority over Commonwealth citizens for jobs. It seems the point of confusion was 
over the term ‘geographical attachment’, as well as nationality, in the EEC provisions 
of EEC citizenship. Whereas the definition of citizenship in Britain was largely an 
‘empty shell’ 78 , based on residency, EEC citizenship was derivative of national 
attachment. Indeed whilst the Six each had their own principle of nationality, the 
British people had never enjoyed a modern legal nationality of their own, due to the 
complex framework established and perpetuated from the 1948 BNA. 79  This 
discrepancy between the definitions of citizenship was the source of the 
inconsistencies in immigration policy between the EEC and  Britain and ultimately 
led to a new conception of British citizenship.80  
 Aside from citizenship, the government found that current immigration 
controls would have to be brought in line with EEC regulations, highlighting Britain’s 
island mentality with its focus on external border controls:  
‘[Joining the EEC] might lead to pressure for the adoption of a system of 
immigration control more on continental lines, with the emphasis on internal 
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controls rather than at the point of entry; and in any event in time it might 
prove impracticable to maintain our present methods.’81  
Furthermore, elites were fearful that the power to deport those not economically 
active would be at stake, as ‘under the EEC rules the power to deport must not be 
invoked to serve economic ends’. 82  It was however concluded that ‘we could 
presumably deport someone who, it subsequently transpired, had come to live off 
social security benefits’, an issue, it seems, which remains politically unresolved, and 
one which Prime Minister Cameron placed squarely on the agenda in his EU reform 
negotiations.  
 As accession approached in the early 1970s, now familiar fears of EEC 
nationals coming to Britain to “welfare shop” were on the horizon.83 Some believed 
that EEC nationals would place a burden on public funds, namely because Britain was 
exceptional in comparison to other EEC members in that it provided social security 
assistance to anyone regardless of nationality. It was feared that EEC nationals might 
be attracted to Britain specifically for this reason.84 The government was nonetheless 
conscious that they could not deprive any migrant of social security benefits as it 
would undermine the logic of inclusion in the welfare state. 
 Despite fears over the incompatibility between social security systems 
across the Community, following an enquiry into Belgium’s experience under the 
provisions of the Treaty of Rome (Belgium was regarded as the most comparable 
country to Britain), it was concluded that Britain would not face any difficult 
problems with respect to immigration controls but that ‘the major difficulty would be 
the political problems arising from our policy on Commonwealth migration’.85 As a 
result of this impending wave of permit-free labour, the British government resolved 
that EEC nationals would have to have priority in filling labour market shortages over 
Commonwealth citizens, although it was noted that, 
‘Given the small scale of entry of Commonwealth workers at present, and the 
fact that many of them have the special qualifications called for under 
category B, it seems unlikely in practice that EEC priority would be 
significant, since these are in universal short supply86. ‘ 
Yet while the Home Office repeatedly claimed that immigration flows from the EEC 
would be small87, it was found that prior to accession EU migrants were granted a 
large proportion of work permits; 23,000 work permits a year (representing 40 per 
cent of the total permits to foreigners) were issued to EEC nationals.88 Of these 8,600 
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went to Italians, and this figure was rising.89 This was unexpected and in light of this 
impending wave of permit-free labour, Heath rejected a proposal to increase the 
issuance of non-EEA work permits from 3,500 to 5,500 on the grounds that this figure 
was unjustifiably high. 90  Perhaps to Heath’s relief, the Chairman of the official 
Committee on Britain’s Approach to Europe noted that ‘it may be expected that such 
factors as language and climate would militate against any large influx of Italian 
labour into this country’.91  Key to the government’s evaluations of the implication of 
free movement was that ‘in practice more European nationals than Commonwealth 
nationals were already admitted to the UK’, and therefore the ‘basic change between 
EEC nationals and Commonwealth nationals ‘was more apparent than real in view of 
the existing pattern of immigration’.92  
 The politics surrounding such an explicitly controversial preference for EEC 
nationals over Commonwealth citizens did not go unnoticed in Parliament or 
Whitehall, although the easing of immigration restrictions on over 200 million people 
was subject to surprisingly little public discussion 93 . It was acknowledged that 
problems could ensue at a local level if unemployment was particularly high, due to 
competition from EEC nationals. The government was also aware that the trade 
unions would most likely be alarmed at the prospect of an EEC national coming to 
Britain on the basis of only a job advertisement94, although it was noted that the Trade 
Union Congress’s concerns were now ‘less acute’ than they previously had been in 
Britain’s first bid for membership.95 
 First and foremost, being both the leader of the Commonwealth and an EEC 
Member State now put the government in a geopolitically awkward position:  
‘It would be politically untenable to put Commonwealth citizens in general so 
much at a disadvantage with foreigners, but socially disastrous to throw the 
doors as widely open to Commonwealth citizens in general as to nationals of 
other member states-and the middle course of lifting the control only for 
citizens of the old Commonwealth countries (to which there would be 
practical objection) would offend against the principle that control should 
apply equally to the citizens of all overseas Commonwealth territories.96 ‘ 
This proved to be very problematic for the government. Asked whether priority would 
be given to EEC nationals over Commonwealth citizens, ‘consistently ministers’ 
replies sought to duck the issue’.97  
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 There was general agreement amongst the Cabinet that ‘there would be grave 
objection of principle to amending Commonwealth policy through the introduction of 
differentiation on the grounds of colour between immigrants from different 
Commonwealth countries’. 98  This represented a major juncture for the British 
government, where assessing Britain’s role in the Commonwealth came to the fore.  
 These were the ‘formative years’ of Commonwealth reflection and the 
discussions amongst the political elite reveal ‘the government’s disillusionment with, 
and skepticism about the Commonwealth’. 99  It was felt that as Commonwealth 
membership expanded, the Commonwealth was ‘becoming less viable as a forum for 
inter-governmental consultation and discussion’100, leading to a major inquiry into the 
value of the Commonwealth to Britain led by the Foreign Office and the 
Commonwealth Office (merged in 1968).  
 Whilst the Commonwealth Office perhaps unsurprisingly touted the continual 
relevance of the Commonwealth, the Foreign Office was skeptical; support for the 
‘Commonwealth in Britain was perceived by the department as a minority view’, and 
memories of a ‘shared collective history’ would weaken. 101  The Commonwealth 
Secretary suggested that whilst the Commonwealth connection still had ‘substantial 
material and political value for us…there had been major changes in the 
Commonwealth in recent years, and we should make it clear that we were not 
prepared to sustain the Commonwealth whatever the cost to us might be’.102 The old 
concept of the Commonwealth, of a cohesive body with common interests in defence 
and trade, had dissipated and arguments about safeguarding Commonwealth interests 
had given way to the view that Britain’s interests must prevail. Such sentiments 
filtered through to immigration policy.  
 A newly elected Prime Minister Heath had one primary goal above all else − to 
secure Britain’s membership in the Community103. It would therefore ‘be essential to 
avoid giving any impression that the Government were half-hearted in their 
decision’.104 Thus for Heath free movement of labour consequently fell,  
‘…into the second category i.e. questions to be discussed after we have joined. 
It is important that nothing should be said (particularly at this pre-negotiation 
stage) that casts doubt or which appear to add to the list of matters on which 
we wish to negotiate with the Six.’105. 
From the government’s perspective, the final political benefit was that in contrast to 
Commonwealth workers most European workers did not settle in Britain. : 
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‘…for the most part they [Europeans] did not settle here as did immigrants 
from the Commonwealth. It seemed improbable that these patterns would 
change and unlikely that immigration of European workers in the future would 
be of a scale which would cause any serious political or industrial 
difficulty…indeed to the extent that our economy was suffering from a 
shortage of labour in the longer term, the immigration of further workers from 
Europe was to be welcomed on grounds’.106  
Emblematic of a time where governments across the West sought to attract “labour 
not people”, the assumed temporary nature of European immigration unsurprisingly 
served to reinforce the government’s preferential decision.  
 With a potentially large pool of unlimited EEC immigration imminent, it 
was finally resolved that Commonwealth settlement migration must be curtailed. Thus 
the 1971 Act was, in part, a manifestation of Britain’s conflicting geopolitical 
interests; to be the leader of a now crumbling Empire, or to be a fully engaged 
member of an increasingly powerful supranational institution. Ultimately the 
government went with the latter, believing that ‘the political gains outweigh the 
political costs’107, hence the final dismantling of universal Commonwealth citizenship 
and, in this sense, a definitive acceptance of the end of the Empire108.  
 
 
Conclusion 
Whilst the racial demographic logic was the basis of Britain’s post-war immigration 
policy, the final dismantling of Commonwealth citizenship with the passage of the 
1971 Act stems from a shift in international allegiances and geopolitical positioning. 
If a piece of legislation has ever explicitly demonstrated Britain’s abandonment of the 
Commonwealth as its primary inter-governmental institution, it was this statute. The 
new geopolitical positioning led to the government having to make a choice between 
an Empire that it had fought to retain and an economically successful and powerful 
supranational bloc. The government evidently chose the latter, in turn ending Britain’s 
policy of Commonwealth preference. The accession to the EEC in 1973 marked a 
new era of transnational allegiances, based on mutual economic and trading interests, 
as opposed to a shared colonial history, and Britain’s immigration policy reflected this 
shift.  
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 The discrepancy between EEC citizenship and those holding CUKC status 
forced the government to re-evaluate the notion of British citizenship which revealed 
the inconsistencies and contradictions between descent, belonging, civic participation 
and ultimately the mix between jus sanguis and jus soli foundations. A concept which 
neither defined British national identity, nor matched Britain’s civic rights, was a 
remnant of the Commonwealth which was largely ‘an empty shell, a politico-legal 
category, rather than a civic identity’.109 The Act lay the way ten years later for Prime 
Minister Thatcher to once and for all abolish Britain’s fragmented colonial citizenship 
in place of a new citizenship exclusively for the UK. 
Without doubt Britain’s post-war immigration policy was underpinned by 
racialism and the 1971 Act was an emblem of this. But the foremost statute was, at 
the very least, partly driven by wider foreign policy interests, a significant fact which 
has been overlooked in this narrative. This is important as it demonstrates that 
immigration policy is driven by multitude of factors. Studies of immigration 
policymaking are too often conducted in silos, with little appreciation for the wider 
political agenda. Indeed ‘Britain’s search for a viable relationship with the European 
Community, and contemporaneous changes in the British Empire and 
Commonwealth, are usually treated as two quite distinct and separate fields…This has 
tended to obscure the extent to which developments in the one area of British foreign 
policy influenced events in the other’110  
These findings demonstrate the necessity for scholars to look beyond the overt 
political surface and delve into the black box of policymaking, where the by-product 
rationales of immigration policy are so often found. Ultimately immigration policy is 
rarely confined to the issue at hand, but is rather exemplary of the multitude of policy 
drivers affected by the economic, political, social and international spheres.  
The Act itself and the geopolitical rationale behind the statute has had major 
effects, not least because it remains the principal instrument for making policy. Had 
Heath retained the Commonwealth preference, today’s foreign-born population may 
look markedly different. What is remarkable is just how reminiscent the current 
debate is to the debate at the time of this critical juncture; the numbers game persists, 
and as EU mobility has increased so the current government have clamped down on 
non-EU routes   where Commonwealth migrants now transit. The symbolic decision 
to abandon the Commonwealth in favour of the EEC effectively ushered in today’s 
immigration debate. Such a major decision, which received so little public attention at 
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the time, is now dominating the political and public agenda. Indeed, the 2016 EU 
Referendum result, which was manifestly influenced by debates around EU free 
movement, has heralded Britain’s eventual withdrawal from the Union, and thus like 
the Commonwealth, we will see a farewell to Britain’s involvement in the once prized 
Community.   
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